Ruto-ODM pact turns 2027 poll coalition deal amid questions

President William Ruto with Deputy President Kithure Kindiki, ODM Leader Oburu Oginga and Prime Cabinet Secretary Musalia Mudavadi, alongside Members of Parliament, Governors, Senators and Cabinet Secretaries, during the broad-based government retreat at Lake Naivasha Resort in Nakuru County. [Kipsang Joseph, Standard]

The three-day joint leadership retreat in Naivasha has offered the clearest indication yet that Kenya’s broad-based government is no longer merely an arrangement for sharing power and stabilising the country, but is increasingly being shaped into a political vehicle for next year's General Election.

Held at Lake Naivasha Resort, the high-level meeting brought together President William Ruto, ODM and UDA leaders to discuss the coalition framework, address sticky political issues, review the government agenda and service delivery alignment.

But beneath the speeches about cooperation, development and national unity lies a more uncomfortable question: what exactly has the broad-based government delivered since the political partnership was formed, and is it strong enough to persuade Kenyans to give the same arrangement another term?

The Naivasha retreat is significant because it brings together many of the same political forces that previously negotiated the 10-point agenda following the political tensions that followed the 2022 election.

The arrangement between President Ruto and the late ODM leader Raila Odinga was initially presented as an attempt to lower political temperatures, address some of the grievances raised by the opposition and create a platform for national dialogue.

Now, with the election one year away, the language has shifted. The conversation is increasingly about a joint manifesto, a pre-election coalition and the possibility of the two sides seeking a fresh mandate together.

ODM party leader  Oburu Odinga's remarks in Naivasha captured the confidence with which the party now views its role inside government.

“Since we came, those Kenyans who see and have ears to hear have noticed that ODM has made a difference in the governance of the country,” Oburu said.

The statement is politically important. ODM is no longer presenting itself as an opposition movement influencing government from outside. It is now claiming ownership of part of the government's record. That, however, also means the party must accept responsibility for the administration's successes and failures.

If ODM has made a difference in governance, as Oburu argues, then Kenyans are entitled to ask what that difference has been.

The 10-point agenda provides one way of measuring it. Several of the commitments associated with the Ruto-Raila understanding remain unfinished.

NADCO's electoral reform agenda

There have been some movement, including the reconstitution of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) and enactment of some related laws. But important pieces of the reform programme have remained incomplete.

Proposed amendments to electoral laws and election offences legislation have not fully closed the gaps identified during the national dialogue process.

That matters because electoral reform was not an incidental part of the political agreement. It was at the heart of the effort to address the disputes and mistrust that have repeatedly surrounded Kenyan elections.

With 2027 approaching, unfinished electoral reforms raise an obvious question: can the political coalition ask Kenyans to trust the same political arrangement to oversee another election while some of the reforms intended to strengthen that election remain incomplete?

The same problem appears in the proposed constitutional protection of development funds.

NADCO recommended entrenching NG-CDF, NGAAF and the Senate Oversight Fund in the Constitution. Although the relevant legislation has moved through Parliament, the process has not reached its final destination.

There is therefore a distinction between government action and government achievement.

A Bill moving through Parliament is progress. It is not, however, the same thing as a completed constitutional reform. That distinction runs through much of the broad-based government's record.

Youth employment

The government has launched programmes such as NYOTA and other initiatives designed to support employment and entrepreneurship. But the real question is not how many programmes have been launched or how many young people have been registered. It is whether young Kenyans have found sustainable sources of income.

Lately, a new study by the African Institute for Development Policy (AFIDEP) in partnership with CAP-YEI (Youth Empowerment Institute), revealed that nearly 1 million young Kenyans enter the labour market every year, but more than 80 per cent of those who secure employment end up in informal jobs without written contracts, health insurance, social security contributions or income security.

Public debt

The  government has undertaken debt restructuring and liability-management measures aimed at easing pressure on the Exchequer. But managing debt is not the same as solving Kenya's structural debt problem.

At the Start mid 2024 Total public debt was KSh 10.6 but currently, in mid-2026, the total public debt has reached approximately KSh 13.01 trillion. Meaning that the debt within the broad- based government keeps increasing compared to earlier.

Debt servicing continues to consume a significant portion of government revenue, limiting the resources available for development and public services.

The plight of victims of protests also raises questions.

The government allocated Sh2 billion towards compensation of victims, particularly those affected during the 2024 demonstrations. But allocation is only the beginning.

The real measure is whether victims actually received compensation, whether families received justice and whether those responsible for abuses were held accountable.

Maureen Nduku’s death last week was the latest incident of police brutality, where she was shot in the busy Gikomba area.

This has happened just months after other families of police brutality were compensated. Thus, questions revolve on the unending cycle of police brutality as the broad-based government had aimed to stop at the start of their coordination.

This is where the broad-based government's political narrative risks colliding with the lived experience of ordinary Kenyans.

The administration can point to programmes, legislation, allocations and institutional changes. But citizens judge governments differently.

They judge them through the cost of living, employment opportunities, electricity supply, taxes, public services and whether promises translate into tangible improvements.

The performance of individual ODM leaders in government also complicates the party's claim that its entry has transformed governance.

Energy Cabinet Secretary Opiyo Wandayi, for example, has had to confront persistent complaints over electricity outages. When widespread blackouts hit the country, Wandayi attributed the problem largely to ageing infrastructure rather than insufficient generating capacity.

He argued that the country's installed generation capacity was adequate to meet demand and promised improvements in infrastructure.

But for ordinary Kenyans, the distinction between generation capacity and infrastructure failure offers little comfort when businesses lose stock, factories stop production, and households are left without power.

Treasury Cabinet Secretary John Mbadi has also operated under difficult fiscal circumstances, with public debt remaining high and debt-servicing obligations placing pressure on government finances. Reports of commitment fees and penalties on unutilised loans have further raised questions about how efficiently public borrowing is being managed.

Cabinet Secretary Hassan Joho has meanwhile faced the challenge of balancing regulatory enforcement with economic activity, including action against Tata Chemicals Magadi over compliance issues.

Cooperatives Cabinet Secretary Wycliffe Oparanya has had to grapple with debt and financial pressures within the cooperative and coffee sectors, including longstanding liabilities.

None of these challenges can be blamed entirely on the individual Cabinet secretaries. They are products of wider structural problems within government.

But that is precisely the point. Once opposition leaders cross into government, the shield of opposition politics disappears.

They can no longer simply identify problems. They become responsible for solving them. This makes Oburu's Naivasha declaration particularly significant.

By saying that ODM has “made a difference” in governance, he is effectively asking Kenyans to evaluate the party not only as the political movement that once challenged the government, but as a governing partner.

And that raises perhaps the biggest question emerging from Naivasha. Was the  broad-based government created primarily to calm the political tensions of the post-2022 period, or was it designed to fundamentally change how Kenya is governed?

If it was the latter, then the 2027 campaign cannot simply be built around the promise of unity. Kenyans will ask what unity achieved.

The Naivasha retreat may therefore be the beginning of a new political coalition, but it is also an unexpected audit of the old one. The leaders gathered there are attempting to convince Kenyans that they can govern together after the 2027 election.

Before they can make that case convincingly, they must answer a harder question:

If the 10-point agenda remains unfinished, if NADCO reforms are incomplete, if debt remains a burden, if youth unemployment persists, and if citizens continue questioning the quality of public services, why should Kenyans believe that doing the same thing again will produce a different result?